Optimal Contract Design for Incentive-Based Demand Response by Dobakhshari, Donya G. & Gupta, Vijay
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Abstract—A principal selects a group of agents to execute a
collection of tasks according to a specified order. Agents, however,
have their own individual ordering preferences according to
which they wish to execute the tasks. There is information
asymmetry since each of these ordering preferences is private
knowledge for the individual agent. The private nature of the
priorities of the individual agents (adverse selection) leads to
the effort expended by the agents to change from the initial
preferred priority to the realized one to also be hidden as well
(moral hazard). We design a mechanism for selecting agents and
incentivizing the selected agents to realize a priority sequence for
executing the tasks that achieves socially optimal performance in
the system, i.e., maximizes collective utility of the agents and the
principal. Our proposed mechanism consists of two parts. First
the principal runs an auction to select some agents to allocate
the tasks, based on the ordering preference they bid. Each
task is allocated to one agent. Then, the principal rewards the
agents according to the realized order with which the tasks were
performed. We show that the proposed mechanism is individually
rational and incentive compatible. Further, it is also socially
optimal under linear cost of ordering preference modification
by the agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
When you ask people to perform tasks for you, they often
prefer to perform them in an order that is different than you
would prefer. Is there a way to jointly choose and incentivize
people to behave in the order you would prefer? This is the
problem considered herein.
Consider a setting in which a system operator hires some
agents selected from several possible agents to execute a group
of tasks. The operator has a quality of service (QoS) constraint
that implies a desired order in which the tasks should be
executed. The agents, however, may prioritize task execution
in a different order depending on their own private preferences;
executing tasks in a different order than preferred may impose
a cost on the agents. Such misalignment of the preferred order
of execution among the principal and the agents, especially
with information asymmetry, creates performance inefficiency
from the principal’s viewpoint. Minimizing this inefficiency
requires the principal to devise an appropriate mechanism to
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select the agents and incentivize them to shift their preferred
priority order for executing the tasks.
Such a mechanism design problem arises in many situations.
For instance, in a cloud computing application, users request
a Cloud Computing Service Provider (CCSP) to perform a
job. The CCSP then allocates the tasks among the servers.
If tasks come in at a high rate and the number of servers
is limited, the tasks may form a task queue [2]–[4]. In this
case, the CCSP may have a preferred order in which the
tasks are executed based on QoS guarantees it has promised
to the users. However, if the servers are independent entities
providing service for a fee, they may follow a different order of
performing the tasks. This misalignment can cause the CCSP
to violate the QoS guarantees it has promised, and hence,
degrade system performance. Thus, the CCSP may wish to
incentivize the servers to follow the requested order.
As another instance, employees of an organization may per-
form tasks (such as responding to emails in technical support)
that are assigned to them in a different order than the one that
is desired by the organization. Since the rate at which humans
can respond to emails is limited, emails pile up [5], [6]. People
generally do not respond to emails in the received order, but
act on them based their own priorities [7]–[10] which may be
based on factors that are both intrinsic (e.g., interest, curiosity,
or information gaps) and extrinsic, (e.g., incentives provided
by the organization). Thus, the organization must incentivize
employees to respond to tasks according to the order preferred
by the organization [11].
In this paper, we design a contract through which the prin-
cipal (the system operator) asks the agents about their private
priorities and incentivizes them to shift their priorities in a way
that is individually rational for the agent and socially optimal.
Specifically, since the agents incur a cost to change their
order from their private preferences, the principal must provide
enough incentives so rational agents will shift their order
to align with the principal. We consider two task allocation
scenarios: (i) indivisible array of tasks for which only one
agent is selected to perform all tasks, and (ii) divisible array
of tasks which can be allocated to multiple agents. We treat
the former as a static (single stage) contract design problem
and the latter as a dynamic (multiple stage) contract design
problem.
Note that for divisible arrays of tasks, the priority sequence
of each agent can vary depending on the allocation history.
That is, the priority of an agent for a task in the future may
change if the agent receives a task at the current stage.
The primary challenge in the design of the contract arises
from the hidden nature of the priorities of the agents who are
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2free to misreport them. Thus, a simple compensation scheme
based on self-reported priority will not be sufficient as the
agents can misreport their private priorities. The private nature
of the agents’ priorities further implies the cost they incur
to change from their preferred order to the realized one is
also hidden. That is, there is both hidden information and
hidden action for the principal. These difficulties are often
referred to as adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively
[12, Chapter 14C and 14B], [13], [14]. Further, the principal
can only observe the order realized by agents selected for
performing the tasks. Thus, she does not have a way to verify
preferences for the other agents. This adds to the complexity
of the problem. Our goal is to design a contract which resolves
these issues and incentivizes the agents to incur sufficient cost
to realize an order that optimizes social welfare.
The setting we consider proceeds as follows: Agent se-
lection by the principal, task performance by the agent, and
compensation to the agent. We assume that for each task,
first, the principal selects the agent to whom to allocate the
task using the priorities self-reported by the agents. Next, the
agent performs the task with a realized order, incurring a cost
for any deviation from preferred order. Finally, the principal
compensates the selected agent using the realized order so as
to achieve social optimality.
Our solution relies on formulating as a two-step contract
design problem for each task: (i) task allocation by the
principal to select the right agents to perform the tasks, and
then (ii) compensation to the agents to execute the tasks in a
desired order. We propose a VCG-based mechanism for the
first step in which the agents announce their private priorities
to the principal and the principal selects the agent to whom to
assign tasks. The payment structure in the second step limits
misreporting by the agents at the first step. In the second step,
we design a compensation scheme based on the observed order
realized by the selected agent and the initially declared priority
orders by the agents. In this two-step design, the agents bid
(possibly falsified) priorities in the first step and the selected
agent optimizes the realized order to perform tasks in the
second step. The principal designs the auction in the first step
and the compensation in the second step.
The model considered herein is inspired by [15], which
presents a queueing-theoretic study of task allocation. How-
ever, unlike [15], we do not consider the realized order as
a given and fixed function of the priority of the principal
and interests of the agent, but as a design parameter for
the agent to maximize his own utility. Although there is a
vast literature on multi-agent task scheduling literature (see,
e.g., [11], [16]–[19]), prior work does not consider either
information asymmetry between the agents and the principal
or the design of incentives. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first work to adopt a game-theoretic approach
to analyzing priority misalignments between task senders and
task receivers with both moral hazard as well as adverse
selection.
VCG mechanisms have long been used for incentive de-
sign in the case of hidden information in principal-agent
problems [12, Chapter 23], [20, Chapter 5]. In particular,
VCG mechanisms are used to incentivize agents to reveal
their true private information and to guarantee the efficient
(socially optimal) outcome in dominant strategies [21]–[25].
The VCG mechanism deals with adverse selection only, not
moral hazard. Thus, a VCG-based mechanism is effective only
for the first step of our problem when we select the agents
(based on their declared private information) to perform the
tasks under adverse selection, but not for the second step when
hidden effort is also present. How VCG may interact with
the second step of compensating hidden effort is, a priori
unclear. Further, notice the notion of social welfare that VCG
maximizes is only the sum of utilities of the agents. Here
as part of the social welfare, we also include utility of the
principal, which is a function of hidden effort.
Our main contribution is a game-theoretic approach to
the problem of task allocation and priority realization when
there is information asymmetry and possibility of misreporting
private information by the agents. Since there is both hidden
information and action, it differs from pure adverse selection
or pure moral hazard. We propose a VCG-based mechanism
followed by an incentivization method for the problem. We
show that under the proposed scheme, agents act truthfully
in reporting their preferred order as a dominant strategy.
Moreover, the principal can achieve the socially optimal
outcome and guarantee individual rationality and incentive
compatibility, through the proposed mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the problem statement and some preliminaries. Sec-
tion III proposes and analyzes our incentive mechanism for the
task delegation problem. Section IV concludes by presenting
potential directions for future work.
II. MODEL
Consider a group of I+1 decision makers. Decision maker 0
is the principal, who is interested in a sequence of tasks being
performed in a particular order. Decision makers i = 1, . . . , I
are agents with their own private priorities for performing the
tasks 1. The principal must incentivize the agents to perform
the tasks in the desired order.
The principal seeks to delegate K tasks, denoted tk =
t1, . . . , tK , to the self-interested agents. We suppose all decision
makers have an associated preference order for executing
tasks. Let X = [x1, . . . ,xK ]∈Z+ 2 represent the priority (order)
based on which the principal desires the tasks to be executed
where xk is the priority for executing the kth task. Formally,
if the principal desires task tk to be performed in mth priority
(order), we set xk = m. For example, if the principal would
like task t3 to be performed first, we set x3 = 1. We call X the
priority of the principal. Similarly, let Yi = [yi1, . . . ,yiK ] ∈ Z+
represent the priority of ith agent to perform the tasks, where
yik is the priority of the ith agent for fulfilling the task tk.
Formally, if agent i prefers to perform task tk in order (time)
m, yik =m. We call Yi the priority of the ith agent. The vector X
is public knowledge whereas the vector Yi is private knowledge
to the ith agent. The principal wishes agents to prioritize tasks
according to X . Agent i, on the other hand, has his own set of
1We will henceforth use she/her for the principal, and he/his for agents.
2 Z+ is the set of positive integers.
3interests and naturally prioritizes tasks according to Yi if not
incentivized otherwise.
The principal selects the agents and incentivizes them to
execute the tasks in an order as close to X as possible. Given
the incentive, if the ith agent is selected to execute task tk,
let zik be the realized order of execution for task tk. Similarly,
Zi = [zi1, . . . ,ziK ] represents the realized order for all tasks.
Further, denote by h(yik,zik) the cost for agent i to change
his performance from yik to zik. That is, when an agent with
priority yik is selected and he performs the tasks with order
zik, he incurs the cost h(yik,zik). In the following we illustrate
the definition through an example.
Example 1. Consider a setting as described above with 4
tasks and one agent. We assume the priority of the principal
is X = [1,2,3,4], i.e., she prefers task t1 be performed first, task
t2 second, task t3 third, and task t4 last. Further, we assume
the agent would prefer to perform task t2 first, then task t1,
then task t4, and finally task t3. Thus, we can write Y as Y =
[2,1,4,3].
Without any incentive, the agent follows his own priority Y
to perform the tasks, i.e., Z = Y . Suppose that the principal
offers an incentive to the agent to change his priority to better
align with hers. If the incentive is provided by the principal
to the agent, suppose the agent performs the tasks with the
following realized order Z = [1,2,4,3]. In the presence of a
(proper) incentive, the realized order Z better matches the
priority of principal X compared to the initial priority Y .
If agent i is selected to perform task tk, the order in which
the task was actually executed zik is observed by the principal.
Note that the priority modification by the agent i enhances the
performance of the organization and leads to profit S(xk,zik)
for the principal. Contrarily, if i is not selected, neither Yi nor
Zi is observable for that agent, since the agent is not assigned
any task to realize the priority Zi.
Since the principal does not have access to the priorities
of the agents’ Yi values, these variables are not contractible.
In fact, if the principal asks about the Yi vectors, the agents
can misreport them as Y ′i to try and exploit the incentive
mechanism for more benefit, where Y ′i = [y′i1, . . . ,y
′
iK ] and y
′
ik
is the reported priority of the ith agent to fulfil task tk.
For simplicity, we define the misalignment between various
priorities for task tk as a scalar, which is the absolute value
of their difference, cf. Spearman’s footrule that has strong
robustness properties with respect to any notion of distance
among rankings and is equivalent to the other popular notion
of distance, Kendall’s tau [26].
Definition 1. Let the misalignments between the various
priority for task tk be
θik = |xk− yik|, θ ′ik = |xk− y′ik|, γik = |xk− zik|,
where θik and γik denote the initial priority misalignment and
the realized priority misalignment between the agent i and the
principal respectively. Further, θ ′ik is the priority misalignment
declared by the agent initially.
Assumption 1. We assume that the cost h(yik,zik) is a function
of the misalignments |xk−yik| and |xk−zik|. Further the profit
S(xk,zik) is a function of the misalignment |xk− zik|.
In the sequel, we abuse notation and denote the cost as
h(θik,γik) and the profit of the principal as S(γik).
Assumption 2. We assume that for a given γik, h(θik,γik)
is an increasing function of θik, so agent i incurs a higher
cost when modifying a larger initial misalignment with the
principal. Further, we assume S(·) is a decreasing function,
so the principal’s profit decreases as the realized misalignment
increases.
Again, let us emphasize that we assume θik is private
information for agent i and thus can be misreported as θ ′ik,
whereas γik is observable to the principal.
The timeline of the problem is as follows. Suppose that
at each step one task is allocated to an agent for execution,
i.e., task tk is allocated at time/stage k. For each task tk, the
principal first receives the (possibly false) reported misalign-
ment θ ′1k, . . . ,θ
′
Ik of all agents and she chooses an agent wk
based on an as yet undetermined mechanism. The principal
then observes the realized misalignment of the agent γwkk and
pays every agent i an amount equal to Pik(θ ′1k, . . . ,θ
′
Ik,γwkk).
The mechanism to choose the agent as well as the payment
are committed ex ante.
The utilities of the various decision makers are as follows.
Suppose agent wk is selected to execute task tk. Then, the
utility Uik of the ith agent at stage k is:
Uik =
{
Pik(θ ′1k, . . . ,θ
′
Ik,γik)−h(θik,γik), i = wk
Pik(θ ′1k, . . . ,θ
′
Ik,γik), i 6= wk
. (1)
The utility of the principal at stage k is:
Vk = S(γwkk)−
I
∑
i=1
Pik(θ ′1k, . . . ,θ
′
Ik,γwkk). (2)
and the total utility of the agent and the principal over all the
stages (tasks) is Ui = ∑Kk=1 Uik and V = ∑
K
k=1 Vk, where K is
the number of tasks.
We are interested, in particular, in mechanisms that are
socially optimal (efficient). An incentive mechanism is socially
optimal if the decision makers choose to realize an outcome
that maximizes the social welfare:
Π=V +
I
∑
i=1
Ui.
The problem faced by each agent i is to optimize the choice
of reported misalignment θ ′i = {θ ′i1, . . . ,θ ′iK} instead of θi =
{θi1, . . . ,θiK}, and if chosen to perform the task tk, the choice
of realized priority γik, to maximize his utility (subject to the
principal’s choices). The problem faced by the principal is to
choose the agent wk for each task tk to execute the task and to
design the payment Pik to optimize the social welfare (subject
to the choices of the agents). Thus, the design problem is:
P1 :

{wk,Pik}= argmax Π
subject to θ ′∗i = argmax Ui, ∀i,
γ∗ik = argmax Ui, i = wk,
additional constraints
. (3)
4We consider the following two additional constraints inP1.
(i) Individual Rationality (IR): This participation constraint
implies that under the incentive mechanism
Uik ≥ 0 for all i,k .
Informally, the agents, acting rationally, prefer to par-
ticipate in the proposed contract rather than opting out.
This constraint limits the space of contracts by, e.g.,
precluding contracts based only on penalties.
(ii) Incentive Compatibility (IC): A payment or a contract
is incentive compatible if agents submit their hidden in-
formation truthfully if asked. Specifically, this constraint
implies that the utility of an agent does not increase if
they report θ ′i 6= θi; i.e., for any i:
Ui(θ1, . . . ,θi−1,θ ′i ,θi+1, . . . ,θI)
≤Ui(θ1, . . . ,θi−1,θi,θi+1, . . . ,θI).
We make the following two further assumptions.
Assumption 3. If agent i is selected, the realized misalignment
by the agent is always less than or equal to the initial
misalignment, i.e., γik ≤ θik. That is, the agent does not gain
any benefit by increasing his misalignment with the principal.
Thus, if he wishes to incur cost to changes his priority, he
reduces the misalignment with the principal.3
Given this assumption, the principal can restrict the falsi-
fication by the agents in reporting their priorities through an
appropriate payment function. Note that θi is not observable
to the principal even if agent i is selected to execute the tasks.
Thus, the principal must instead rely on θ ′i for the payment
scheme. However, the principal may pay an agent only if
γi ≤ θ ′i to restrict falsification by the agent. We assume such
a payment scheme is used and the agents behave as follows.
Assumption 4. Agent i, if selected for task tk, chooses γik and
θ ′ik such that γik ≤ θ ′ik. In other word, since γik is observable
by the principal, she can penalize the agent an arbitrary
large penalty if the agent’s declared misalignment is less than
the realized priority misalignment. Thus, the agent always
performs such that γik ≤ θ ′ik.
Going forward, we consider two specific scenarios.
(i) Indivisible array of tasks: All tasks must be executed by
one agent. In this case, the principal optimally chooses
one agent to execute the array of tasks [t1, . . . , tk] and
then compensates the agent for any misalignment cost
incurred. This implies a single-stage game.
(ii) Divisible array of tasks: Tasks can be allocated to
multiple agents over multiple stages. In each stage k,
the principal chooses an agent to perform task tk, then
compensates the agent for any priority modification.
Within the divisible array setting, we consider two possi-
bilities: either agents’ private priorities are fixed or they
dynamically become more aligned with the principal as
they perform tasks for her.
3Note that this assumption might not be valid in case of a malicious agent
which is not in the scope of this paper.
The choice of the agent(s) to execute tasks is challenging since
the payment function is committed ex ante.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We propose a mechanism in which, for each task, first
an agent is selected to execute the task through an auction
mechanism and then payments are made according to the
reported and realized priorities.
A. Central difficulties
The hidden nature of the preferred priorities and the cost
creates hidden information (adverse selection) in the first
stage and hidden action (moral hazard) in the second stage.
Requiring individual rationality and incentive compatibility
significantly constrains the design of each of these steps.
For instance, at the first stage, an auction which asks the
agents to report their priorities and chooses the agents with
the least reported priority misalignment will not be incentive
compatible since it provides an opportunity for the agents to
announce a priority close to that of the principal to be selected.
Similarly, consider a payment scheme in which the agent wk
that is selected to execute the task tk which depends merely
on the reported misalignment θ ′wkk regardless of the realized
priority zwkk (or equivalently γwkk) and ignores the effort cost.
Given θwkk, this payment limits the range of realized priority
such that
h(θwkk,γwkk)≤ P(θ ′wkk) .
There is no a priori guarantee that the resulting priority zwkk
(or equivalently γwkk) will be socially optimal. On the other
hand, a payment that is merely a function of the realized
priority γwkk and ignores the self-reported priorities may also
be too restrictive. In particular, individual rationality will once
again constrain zwkk (or equivalently γwkk) so that given θwkk,
h(θwkk,γwkk)≤ P(γwkk) .
Finally, we note that even if the payment depends on
both θ ′wkk and γwkk to account for the effort cost properly
and satisfy individual rationality, the payment must still be
carefully designed to ensure incentive compatibility. Thus, a
payment function P(θ ′wkk,γwkk) that depends on the level of
effort cost that the agent claims that he incurred for priority
modification provides the opportunity for the agents to behave
strategically. For instance, under such a payment, a strategic
agent may choose not to exert any effort and choose
γwkk = θwkk, θ
′
wkk = argmaxP(θ
′
wkk,γwkk) .
Thus, this payment is not incentive compatible since although
the strategic agent does not change his priority, he obtains a
non-zero payment.
To illustrate the concept, Sec. III-B starts with an indivisible
array of tasks, which considers task delegation to single agent.
Sec. III-C then considers task delegation with multiple agents.
5Fig. 1. Timeline of the interaction between the principal and the agent for
indivisible array of task.
B. Mechanism for indivisible array of tasks
We design a mechanism which has desired properties of in-
dividual rationality, incentive compatibility, and under further
assumptions, social optimality. This mechanism first selects
an agent to execute the tasks and then compensates him. Note
that all tasks are allocated in one stage and a single agent
is chosen to perform [t1, . . . , tk]. Thus, for notational ease, we
drop the subscripts k corresponding to each individual task.
Note that the value of θi, θ ′i , and γi then are:
θi =
K
∑
k=1
θik, θ ′i =
K
∑
k=1
θ ′ik, γi =
K
∑
k=1
γik.
Recall that θi is private information for agent i and can be
misreported as θ ′i , whereas γi is observable to the principal.
Fig. 1 demonstrates the timeline of the problem as follows:
1) Agents are asked to submit their preference vectors
Yi’s (equivalently, the variables θi’s). However, they can
misreport the vectors as Y ′i ’s (equivalently as θ ′i ’s).
2) The principal chooses an agent as the winner of the
auction. Assume that agent w is the winner and must
execute tasks in the next step.
3) Agent w performs the task with a realized order Zw,
choosing the variable γw and incurring the corresponding
cost h(θw,γw).
4) Agent w receives a payment.
We now present our proposed mechanism M .
(i) Allocation: The principal chooses the agent w to execute
all the tasks such that w = argmin{θ ′i }Ii=1.
(ii) Payment: The payment to agent w is chosen as a function
of γw and the second lowest bid
θ¯ = min{θ ′1, · · · ,θ ′w−1,θ ′w+1, · · · ,θ ′I}.
Specifically, we consider a payment Pw(θ¯ ,γw) to agent
w which satisfies two properties:
∀γw, if θw ≥ θ¯ , we have Pw(θ¯ , γw)≤ h(θw, γw) , (4)
∃γw s.t. if θw < θ¯ , we have Pw(θ¯ , γw)> h(θw, γw).
(5)
All other agents i 6= w are not paid.
Remark 1. Notice the conditions in (4) and (5) are essential
for inducing incentive compatibility. An example of a payment
scheme which satisfies this condition for the cost function
h(θw, γw) = θw− γw is of the form Pw(θ¯ , γw) = θ¯ − γw.4
4Generally, if we consider the payment function to be equal to the cost
function, i.e., P = h, based on Assumption 2, conditions (4) and (5) are
satisfied for any θi and γi.
Under mechanism M , the utilities of the agents are:
Ui =
{
Pi(θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi), i = w
0, i 6= w, (6)
while the principal’s utility and social welfare are:
V = S(γw)−Pw(θ¯ , γw), Π= S(γw)−h(θw, γw). (7)
Indeed, mechanism M is incentive compatibile and indi-
vidually rational.
Theorem 1. Consider problem P1. Mechanism M is incen-
tive compatible, i.e., every agent i reports θ ′i = θi. Further, it
satisfies the individual rationality constraint.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 2. The proposed mechanism resembles the celebrated
VCG mechanism in the way it selects w and in the structure
of the proposed payment. However, beyond the fact that the
payment depends on the additional parameter γw, note that
the standard solution of offering a payment of the form
S(γw)−Π?, where Π? denotes the value of the social welfare
under the socially optimal outcome, will not result in the agent
w realizing the socially optimal outcome in our case. This
payment violates (4) and (5) and therefore violates incentive
compatibility.
Although social optimality is difficult to achieve for a
general form of the cost, it can be achieved for the case of
linear cost, i.e., when h(θi, γi) = θi− γi.
Theorem 2. Consider problem P1 with mechanism M . If
the cost is linear and the payment is of the form Pw = θ¯ − γw,
then M solves P1. Specifically, the mechanism realizes the
socially optimal outcome as well as truth-telling by the agents
and individual rationality.
Proof. See Appendix.
C. Mechanism for divisible array of task
Consider task allocation with a divisible array of tasks to
be allocated to multiple agents. We design a task delega-
tion mechanism that has the desired properties of individual
rationality, incentive compatibility, and social optimality by
generalizing the one-winner mechanism in Sec. III-B for
indivisible array of tasks. First, tasks are allocated to the
agents, through an auction for each task, run by the principal.
After task allocation to the agents, the agents perform the tasks
with certain realized order and then are compensated by the
principal for misalignment. Recall the timeline of the problem:
1) Agents are asked to submit their preferred priority for
task tk, i.e., θik. However, they can misreport the value
as θ ′ik.
2) The principal chooses an agent as the winner of the
auction based on the proposed mechanism. Assume that
the agent with index wk is the winner of task tk and must
execute task tk.
3) Agent wk performs the task with a realized order by
choosing γwkk and incurring the corresponding cost
h(θwkk,γwkk).
64) The agents receive a payment based on the proposed
mechanism.
We consider two scenarios for which we discuss the design of
allocation and incentive mechanism:
(i) Fixed private information: Private information θik for
realizing γik for each task tk does not depend on task
allocation history, i.e., the private information θik for
each task tk and each agent i is fixed (ex ante) regardless
of whether the agent has been allocated another task or
not.
(ii) Dynamic private information: Private information of the
agent i, θik, for each task depends on the history of
task allocation. In other words, the priority of an agent
for a task in the future might change if the agent
receives a task at the current stage. For example, if the
agent receives a task in the current stage, his priority
misalignment might decrease for the next task.
1) Fixed private information: In this case, private informa-
tion of agent i, θik is independent of allocation history. Thus,
the proposed mechanism in this case is the repeated (as many
times as the number of tasks) version of the mechanism in
Sec. III-B. This yields mechanism M1.
(i) Allocation: For task tk, the principal chooses the agent
wk to execute the task tk such that wk = argmin{θ ′ik}Ii=1.
(ii) Payment: The payment to agent wk is chosen as a
function of γwkk and the second lowest bid
θ¯wkk = min{θ ′1k, · · · ,θ ′(w−1)k,θ ′(w+1)k, · · · ,θ ′Ik}.
Specifically, we consider a payment Pwkk(θ¯wkk,γwkk) to
agent wk which satisfies two properties for each task tk:
∀γwkk, if θwkk ≥ θ¯wkk, Pwkk(θ¯wkk, γwkk)≤ h(θwkk, γwkk) ,
(8)
∃γwkk s.t if θwkk < θ¯wkk, Pwkk(θ¯wkk, γwkk)> h(θwkk, γwkk).
(9)
All other agents i 6= wk are not paid.
Under mechanism M1, the utilities of the agents are:
Uik =
{
Pik(θ¯ik, γik)−h(θik, γik), i = wk
0, i 6= wk,
, (10)
and the total utility of the agent over all stages (tasks) is Ui =
∑Kk=1 Uik, where K is the number of tasks.
Theorem 3. Mechanism M1 is incentive compatible and it
satisfies the individual rationality constraint.
Proof. The proof is similar to proof of Theorem 1, repeated
for each task tk.
Theorem 4. If the effort cost is linear and the payment is
chosen to be of the form Pwkk = θ¯wkk− γwkk, then mechanism
M1 solvesP1 and the mechanism realizes the socially optimal
outcome as well as truth-telling by the agents and individual
rationality.
Proof. The proof is similar to proof of Theorem 2, repeated
for each task tk.
Here, the strategy chosen by the agents for each task tk,
i.e., reporting θ ′ik, is independent of the strategy chosen for
other tasks. Further, whether reporting θ ′ik occurs a priori or
at each stage makes no difference and we can achieve incentive
compatibility for this framework.
2) Dynamic private information: In this case, agent i’s
private information, θik, depends on the history of task al-
location. Hence, the fact that the agent receives a task in the
past can change his priority misalignment for future tasks. In
particular, we assume a Markov property for θik so θik depends
on whether task tk−1 has been allocated to the agent.
Assumption 5. We assume that if agent i wins the task at time
k− 1, his priority misalignment for task k is θ˜ik. Otherwise,
his priority misalignment is θˆik, i.e.,
θik =
{
θ˜ik, if allocated task tk−1,
θˆik, otherwise,
where θ˜ik < θˆik.
The general case in which the priority misalignment for task
tk depends on entire allocation history increases the problem
complexity significantly and is left for future work.
For the sake of simplicity in the following we proceed with
the linear effort cost.
Assumption 6. We assume effort cost to be linear, i.e., given
θik and γik the effort cost is h(θik,γik) = θik− γik.
Note that unlike the fixed private information setting where
misreporting of private information by the agents at a given
stage did not change utilities of future stages, here the strategy
chosen by the agents at the first stage affects utilities of further
stages. To illustrate, we start with two tasks and two agents,
explaining why we can not use the previous mechanism in the
dynamic private information setting.
Example 2. Consider two tasks for two agents and suppose
we follow mechanismM1. Let us assume the allocation is such
that agent 1 receives the task in the second stage. In this case
at the first stage even if θ11 > θ¯11, agent 1 can still claim that
θ ′11 < θ¯11 and receive the task in the first stage since he might
earn more benefit in stage 2 after receiving the task in the
first stage. Thus, under mechanism M1, the agent will not be
truthful in reporting his private information in the first stage
if the utility he gains in the second stage is more than his loss
θ¯11−θ11 in the first stage, i.e., he falsifies θ11 if
θ¯11−θ11+ θ¯12− θ˜12 < θ¯12− θˆ12.
Thus, mechanism M1 will not achieve incentive compatibility
for the case of dynamic private information.
We now design mechanism M2 for the dynamic private
information setting.
(i) Allocation: The principal chooses the agent wk to execute
the task tk such that{
θ ′wkk + θ˜
′
wkk+1
< θ¯wkk + θˆ
′
wkk+1
, wk allocated tk+1,
θ ′wkk < θ¯wkk, wk not allocated tk+1,
7where θ¯wkk represents the second lowest bid, i.e.,
θ¯wkk = min{θ ′1k, · · · ,θ ′(w−1)k,θ ′(w+1)k, · · · ,θ ′Ik}.5
(ii) Payment: The payment to agent wk is:
Pwkk =
{
θ¯wkk− θ˜wkk+1+ θˆwkk+1, wk is allocated tk+1,
θ¯wkk, wk is not allocated tk+1.
All other agents i 6= wk are not paid.
Theorem 5. Consider problem P1 with mechanism M2.
Under Assumption 6, mechanism M2 solves problem P1.
Specifically, the mechanism realizes the socially optimal out-
come as well as truth-telling by the agents and individual
rationality.
Proof. See Appendix.
D. Discussion
Mechanism design is challenging primarily since our prob-
lem exhibits both hidden information and hidden effort on the
part of the agents without any recourse to verification. The
combination of adverse selection and moral hazard creates a
possibility of rich strategic behavior by the agents. Hence we
needed to design both an auction and a compensation scheme.
If the problem were of either auction design or compensa-
tion design alone, standard mechanisms would have sufficed.
Specifically, for auction design under adverse selection, incen-
tive compatibility, individual rationality, and social optimality
can be achieved by the VCG mechanism. Similarly, for
compensation design to counteract pure moral hazard, social
optimality and individual rationality can be realized through
the standard contract of the form discussed in Remark 2.
However, in our problem, strategic agents can exploit infor-
mation asymmetry to degrade the efficiency of the outcome
under either of the standard solutions for auction design or
compensation for moral hazard alone. Standard approaches
cannot achieve both incentive compatibility and social opti-
mality, similar in spirit to the so-called price of anarchy that
captures the inefficiency in a system due to selfish/strategic
behavior of agents.
The surprising result in Theorem 2 is that for linear effort
cost, we realize all three properties of individual rationality,
incentive compatibility, and social optimality even in this chal-
lenging setting. That this is possible was not a priori obvious,
and it would be interesting to identify further properties, such
as budget balance, that may be achievable.
Impossibility results such as [27], [28] may seem contradic-
tory to the goal of obtaining an efficient, individually rational,
budget-balanced mechanism. It should be noted, however, that
we are restricting attention to a specific class of valuation
functions that are different from those studied there; hence,
the existing impossibility results may not hold. Studying the
existence of such behavior is left for future study.
5Note that the principal chooses the agent at last stage wK to execute the
task tK such that wK = argmin{θ ′iK}Ii=1.
IV. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of contract design between a system
operator and a group of agents that each have a preferred
sequence of performing a collection of tasks. Since the priority
orders for the agents is private information and these orderings
may not align with that of the principal, there is information
asymmetry. The principal selects agent(s) to execute the tasks
to achieve social optimality. The aim is therefore to design a
mechanism for selecting the agent to execute the tasks and to
compensate him to minimize the misalignment of the realized
order with the one that is socially optimal. The problem
features both moral hazard and adverse selection. We proposed
a two-stage mechanism including a VCG-like mechanism for
task allocation followed by a compensation mechanism. We
showed that the mechanism is individually rational, incentive
compatible, and for linear costs, socially optimal.
Future work will consider more general nonlinear cost
functions; this is challenging since mechanisms may not neces-
sarily be socially optimal and the agents might realize a sub-
optimal order of tasks. Other directions include considering
the possibility of designing a mechanism that is also budget
balanced in addition to being individually rational, incentive
compatible, and socially optimal.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Given an arbitrary agent i, its hidden priority θi, and the
reported priority misalignment of the other players, we need
to show that utility of agent i is maximized by setting θ ′i = θi.
Note also that θ¯ denotes the lowest misalignment reported by
other agents. If θi > θ¯ , then agent i loses and receives utility
0. If θi ≤ θ¯ , then agent i wins the tasks and receives utility
Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi) for performance of the task.
We consider two cases. First, if θi > θ¯ , the highest utility
that agent i can gain for any value of γi is:
max{0,Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)}.
According to (4) and (5):
max{0,Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)}= 0.
Thus, agent i achieves this utility by bidding his priority truth-
fully (and losing the auction). Second, if θi ≤ θ¯ , the highest
utility that agent i can gain according to our mechanism is:
max{0,Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)}= Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi),
and agent i achieves this utility by bidding his priority truth-
fully and winning the auction. Note that the utility of the
agent for each case is always non-negative and therefore the
mechanism satisfies individual rationality.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
First notice that according to Assumption 3, we can write
the effort cost as h(θi, γi) = θi− γi.
We first prove that the proposed mechanism design induces
truth-telling as a dominant strategy, i.e., it is incentive com-
patible. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we consider two
8cases. First, if θi > θ¯ , the highest utility that agent i can get
is
max{0,Pi(θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)} .
Given Pi(θ¯ , γi) = θ¯ − γi and h(θi, γi) = θi− γi, the highest
utility that agent i can get if θi > θ¯ is
max{0, θ¯ − γi− (θi− γi)}= {0, θ¯ −θi}= 0, (11)
and agent i gains this utility by bidding truthfully and losing
the auction. Second, if θi ≤ θ¯ , the highest utility that agent i
can get is
max{0, θ¯ − γi− (θi− γi)}= θ¯ −θi, (12)
and agent i gains this utility by bidding his priority truthfully
and winning the auction. Note that another approach to check
incentive compatibility of Pi is to see that Pi satisfies (4) and
(5).
To prove social optimality, we must check both task alloca-
tion by the principal as well as the fact that the selected agent
realizes γ?w. First, for agent selection, note that the socially
optimal outcome is obtained as
argmaxS(γw)− (θw− γw).
Thus, for a given γw, agent w must be chosen with minimum
θw, as chosen by the mechanism. Next, we show that the
agents realizes γ?w through this payment. The socially optimal
outcome is obtained as
γ?w = argmaxS(γw)−h(θw, γw).
On the other hand, given (11) and (12), the utilities of the
agents are:
Ui(θi, θ¯) =
{
θ¯ −θi, i = w
0, i 6= w, (13)
which do not depend on the values of γi. Thus, the agent
is indifferent among his realized priorities and so the agents
realize the socially optimal outcome γ?w.
Note that the utility of the agent in (13) for each case is
always non-negative and therefore the proposed mechanism
satisfies individual rationality.
C. Proof of Theorem 5
We start with the truth-telling property. We prove that under
mechanism M2, each agent i at each time k reveals the true
value of the private information, i.e., θ ′ik = θik. We begin with
the last stage K. If θiK ≤ θ¯iK , the highest utility agent i can
achieve is θ¯iK−θiK , achieved by bidding his priority truthfully.
If θiK > θ¯iK , the highest utility agent i can achieve is
max{θ¯iK−θiK ,0}= 0,
achieved by bidding his priority truthfully. Thus, agent i is
always truthful in reporting valuation for last stage K. Consider
the penultimate stage K−1. Depending on the task allocation
at stage K and the value of θiK−1 and θ¯iK−1, we consider four
cases.
• If agent i does not receive the task at K and θiK−1≤ θ¯iK−1,
the highest utility agent i can achieve is
θ¯iK−1−θiK−1,
which can be achieved when bidding his priority truth-
fully.
• If agent i receives task at K and θiK−1+ θ˜iK ≤ θ¯iK−1+ θˆiK ,
the highest utility agent i can achieve
θ¯iK−1− θ˜iK + θˆiK−θiK−1,
which can be achieved by bidding his priority truthfully.
• If agent i does not receive the task at K and θiK−1 > θ¯K−1,
the highest utility agent i can achieve is
max{θ¯K−1−θiK−1,0}= 0,
which can be achieved by bidding his priority truthfully.
• If agent i receives the task at K and θiK−1+ θ˜iK > θ¯iK−1+
θˆiK , the highest utility agent i can achieve is
max{θ¯iK−1− θ˜iK + θˆiK−θiK−1,0}= 0,
which can be achieved by bidding his priority truthfully.
Thus, the agent i is truthful in reporting his private information
for stage K−1, i.e., θ ′iK−1 = θiK−1. Using backward induction,
it follows that agent i is always truthful in reporting valuation
for any stage k, i.e., θ ′ik = θik.
Note that the utility of each agent for each stage is always
non-negative and therefore the mechanism M2 satisfies indi-
vidual rationality for the agents.
Next, we prove social optimality of mechanism M2. For
the mechanism to be socially optimal note that both agent
selection and compensation to the agents must be optimal.
First note that the allocation that maximizes the social welfare
is as follows: We start with the task allocation at last stage K
and then penultimate stage K−1 for a given realized priority
misalignment γ .
• If agent i receives the tasks at stages K−1 and K, social
welfare at stage K−1 looking forward is:
S− (θiK−1− γ)+S− (θ˜iK− γ).
• If agent i receives task at stage K but not K− 1, social
welfare at stage K−1 looking forward is:
S− (θ¯iK−1− γ)+S− (θˆiK− γ).
• If agent i receives the task at stage K−1 but not K, social
welfare at stage K−1 looking forward is:
S− (θiK−1− γ)+S− (θ¯iK− γ).
• If agent i receive tasks at neither stage K− 1 nor at K,
social welfare at stage K−1 looking forward is:
S− (θ¯iK−1− γ)+S− (θ¯iK− γ).
Given different cases, to maximize social welfare, agent
i receives task at stage K−1 if{
θiK−1+ θ˜iK < θ¯iK−1+ θˆiK if agent i receives task tK
θiK−1 < θ¯iK−1 if agent i not receive tK
,
9and agent i receives task at stage K if{
θ˜iK < θ¯iK if agent i receives task tK−1
θˆiK < θ¯iK if agent i not receive task tK−1
,
i.e., θiK < θ¯iK regardless of the allocation at stage K−1.
Using backward induction, the optimal allocation at each
stage k is when the principal chooses the agent wk to
execute the task tk such that{
θwkk + θ˜wkk+1 < θ¯wkk + θˆwkk+1 wk is allocated tk+1
θwkk < θ¯wkk wk is not allocated tk+1.
Further, given that the agents are truthful in reporting their
private information, the socially optimal mechanism is:{
θ ′wkk + θ˜
′
wkk+1
< θ¯wkk + θˆ
′
wkk+1
wk is allocated tk+1
θ ′wkk < θ¯wkk wk is not allocated tk+1.
So far we found the optimal allocation for maximizing
social welfare. Now we find optimal order realization by
agent i. First note that given the linear cost, social welfare
at stage k is:
S(γwkk)−h(θwkk,γwkk) = S(γwkk)+ γwkk−θwkk
and the socially optimal outcome at each stage k is
obtained as
γ?wkk = argmaxS(γwkk)+ γwkk−θwkk.
Next, we show that agent wk realizes γ?wkk through the
mechanism.
To this end, note that the utility of agent i at stage k is:
Uik =

θ¯ik+1− θ˜ik+1+ θˆik−θik, i = wk, at stage k−1
θ¯ik−θik i = wk, not at stage k−1
0, i 6= wk,
which does not depend on the value of γik. Thus, the
agent is indifferent among his realized priorities and we
conclude the agents realize the socially optimal outcome
γ?wkk.
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